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Abstract
Asymmetric information is widely supposed to impair the functioning of markets. We show
that the presence of competition may invalidate this intuition. Consider a market in which prin-
cipals compete for attracting heterogeneous agents by offering contracts. Suppose contracts are
exclusive, and there are constant returns to trade. When the agents’ types are publicly observed
under mild conditions, competitive equilibria are efficient. Efficiency is also obtained when types
are privately observed, provided that principals do not directly care about the agents’ private in-
formation (the private value case). Thus hidden information only matters in competitive markets
if it affects common values.
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Introduction
On most markets, there is at least one element of asymmetric information: a
seller almost never knows the buyer’s preferences perfectly, and a buyer usually
knows little about production costs, and sometimes product quality. Accord-
ing to the economic literature, this represents a serious impediment to the
working of the economy. Indeed, when studied in bilateral relationships hid-
den information has been shown to provide a rationale for rebates, discounts,
and more generally for non-linear tariffs. It thereby creates distortions that
drive the resulting allocation away from the complete information allocation.
Its impact on competitive markets may even be dramatic; in Akerlof (1970)
competitive equilibria are strongly inefficient due to adverse selection, while
pure-strategy equilibria may fail to exist in the insurance model of Rothschild-
Stiglitz (1976).
This paper proposes to check the impact of competition on equilibrium
allocations by relying on a well-known distinguo. A piece of hidden information
is classified as a private value if it does not impact directly the payoff of other
agents, for given trades between these agents. For example, the preferences of a
buyer are usually private values, because the seller only cares about production
costs and transfers, and not directly about the willingness-to-pay of the buyer.
The case of common values occurs when for example a buyer cares about the
quality of the good sold to him (as in Akerlof’s model, or in financial trading),
or when a bank cares on the reliability of a borrower, or an insurer cares about
the riskiness of an insuree: here profits depend not only on the contract traded,
but also on the information detained by the informed party. It is important to
note that the same piece of information may be classified in either category,
depending on the situation. For example, whether a client is a reckless driver
matters directly to the car insurer, but not to the seller of the car.
To illustrate further, consider procurement contracts. If the buyer is a
private firm, then for given contract terms, the unobserved production costs
of a supplier are a matter of indifference to the buyer. On the other hand,
this need not be the case for public procurement, as the public agency may
give a positive weight to the supplier’s profit (as in Baron-Myerson (1982) or
Laffont-Tirole (1986)); then we are back to a case of common values.
In a little-noticed paper, Fagart (1996, Propositions 6 and 7) proved under
some simplifying assumptions that when contracts are exclusive and values
are private, competitive equilibria do not depend on whether information is
verifiable or hidden, and competitive outcomes are efficient. Thus hidden in-
formation does not change the set of competitive equilibria and does not harm
efficiency, unless it bears at least partly on common values. This note gener-
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alizes her result and proves that it holds in a very general model of exclusive
contracting, with arbitrary preferences1. We only have to assume that for a
given agent’s type, in the principal-agent utility space the Pareto frontier is
continuous and strictly decreasing. The following discussion illustrates the
scope of this efficiency result.
First consider the case in which the type of the agent is verifiable, so that
there is no hidden information. Though apparently simple, this case includes
situations with moral hazard, in which the agent may choose a hidden ac-
tion. As an application, consider the case when employers compete by offering
incentive contracts, and employees choose a contract, and then exert an unob-
servable effort. As announced above, all competitive equilibria are efficient2.
This confirms the result in for example Dam and Perez-Castrillo (2006), which
we extend to (almost) arbitrary models with pure moral hazard.
We then show that efficiency still obtains when hidden information is intro-
duced, and bears on private values. To illustrate, consider the market for new
cars, in which buyers differ along many dimensions: income, taste for engine
power, car size, or safety. Even though producers are allowed to use arbitrary
non-linear tariffs, competition is strong enough to align tariffs with costs, so
that the efficient allocation obtains. In other words, under private values any
observed inefficiency in trade can be attributed to imperfect competition, and
hidden information alone cannot create any inefficiency.
Finally, under common values we show that competitive equilibria are effi-
cient only in special cases: for example, in a standard model with smooth pref-
erences and continuously distributed types, types must be “locally private”, a
condition expressing that an uninformed party trading an efficient contract is
indifferent to small changes in the type of the agent. This condition is rather
stringent. Consider for example the moral hazard model introduced above.
Introducing hidden information on, say, the agent’s cost of effort would give
rise to a model with common value: indeed, for a given incentive contract the
principal still cares on the agent’s type, since this type determines the choice
of effort. According to our results, efficiency only obtains in special cases.
Hence the distinction between private and common values seems to be the
relevant one when one wants to characterize the impact of hidden information
on the efficiency of competitive equilibria. Still the model imposes restrictions
that we acknowledge. Firstly, we only study the “exclusivity” case when the
informed party can only contract with one uninformed party: thus the model is
1We discuss the differences with Fagart’s setting at the end of Section 3.
2Here efficiency refers to second-best efficiency—taking into account the employee’s in-
centive constraints.
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best-fitted for markets with 0-1 demand, or when exclusivity is legally enforced
– car insurance but not life insurance, for instance. The “common agency”
case in which each agent can contract with more than one principal is also
important, but we leave it for future research. Secondly, we assume that
competition is perfect. Interestingly, Inderst (2001) has shown in a model of
imperfect competition with matching that the set of equilibria does not depend
on whether information is public or hidden, provided it bears on private values.
In his model, when two agents are matched one of them is drawn at random
and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other. By contrast, we maintain
the usual model of competition, assuming that uninformed parties propose
contracts among which informed parties freely select.
We also assume that the payoff of the uninformed parties is the (expected)
sum of payoffs realized with each informed party, an assumption that we call
“constant returns to trade”: loosely said, the marginal payoff from signing an
additional contract is constant. This clearly makes competition tougher.
We concentrate here on a partial equilibrium model. General equilibrium
models were first studied in Prescott-Townsend (1984), giving rise to an im-
portant literature (see Bisin-Gottardi (2006), Prescott-Townsend (2006) and
Rustichini-Siconolfi (2006) for recent contributions). These papers aim at ex-
tending the welfare theorems to economies with hidden action and hidden
information. They thus study the existence of a set of markets and prices that
implement (constrained) efficient allocations, when agents take these linear
prices as given. By contrast, our paper deals with price-setters that can use
arbitrary (non-linear) contracts, and studies whether competition among these
agents is efficient. Walrasian-like models with incomplete information have
also been studied by Gul-Postlewaite (1992) and McLean-Postlewaite (2002).
These papers do not study competitive equilibria; but they exhibit sufficient
conditions for the existence of a mechanism that can approximate competitive
outcomes arbitrarily closely when the economy is replicated. The essential
condition is that each agent must have an “informational size” that goes to
zero as the economy grows. As they point out, this condition holds under
private values. Thus our results and theirs can be seen as complementary.
1 The Model
We consider a market in which N ≥ 2 identical principals face heterogenous
agents, and compete to attract them by offering contracts. Agents can be of
type i ∈ I — we put no restrictions on the set I. Feasible exchanges, or
contracts, between a principal and an agent must belong to a set C, resulting
3
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from technological, informational or institutional constraints. If a principal
trades a contract C ∈ C with a type-i agent, then the principal gets a profit
bi(C), and the type-i agent gets a payoff vi(C). Each agent can only contract
with a single principal (exclusivity). The total payoff of a principal is simply
the expectation of bi(C), using the distribution of all trades (sell C to i) agreed
with the agents: there are thus constant returns to trade. This assumption
renders identical the case of a distribution of agents, and the case of a single
agent whose type is randomly drawn. For simplicity, we adopt the former
convention. We model “no trade” by introducing in C a contract C∅, such
that for any type i bi(C
∅) = 0 = vi(C∅).
We distinguish two situations. In the “Verifiable Types” case, types i are
publicly observed by both agents and principals and discrimination is allowed,
so that a principal may decide to make a contract available only for a subset
of types. Under constant returns to trade, the situation is thus equivalent to
one in which there is only one type of agent. On the other hand, some actions
may not be verifiable; thus this case includes what the literature calls “hidden
action” or moral hazard.
In the “Hidden Information” case, types are privately observed by agents
(or discrimination is not allowed), so that principals cannot exclude some types
of agents from choosing a given available contract. If bi(C) = b(C) for all i ∈ I
and all C ∈ C, we say that there are private values, and otherwise that there
are common values.
Such an abstract model allows us to cover a variety of situations. In models
of trade, a contract is a pair (q, t), meaning that the buyer must pay a monetary
transfer t for delivery of a bundle of goods described by q; q may gather any
relevant informations on quantities or qualities. The buyer may be informed on
his preferences, or the seller may be informed on his costs, as in procurement
models; both cases are instances of private values. Common values occur for
example when the seller of a good has a private information on its quality.
In pure moral hazard models, a contract writes (w(.),(ei)i∈I), where the
incentive scheme w(.) maps a set of public outcomes into a transfer from
the principal to the agent, and each ei is the effort chosen by a type-i agent
when faced with w(.); thus each ei must be incentive-compatible for type i.
The restriction to incentive-compatible contracts is without loss of generality.
Notice that when there are multiple types, bi(C) will typically depend on i
through the agent’s choice of effort, so that we are in the common value case.
Finally note that by modifying the definition of C, one can allow for lotteries
in a contract (i.e. the price paid for a given quantity may be stochastic).
Lotteries on contracts ca also be allowed by considering the set of distributions
on the set of feasible contracts.
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We can now study the Pareto frontier in the utility space, that we param-
eterize by the principal’s profit B ≥ 0:
V i(B) = sup
C∈C
{vi(C) s.t. bi(C) ≥ B} (1)
At this stage we only know that V i is non-increasing. Our first assumption
is mainly technical, and is likely to be verified in most economic situations:
Assumption 1. There exists B < +∞ such that for every types V i(B) is
negative (or −∞). Moreover, for any type i ∈ I, if 0 < V i(0) < +∞, then V i
is continuous at the right of zero.
As we shall see later relaxing the second part would allow for some zero-
profit equilibria that are nevertheless inefficient. Our main assumption is in
fact the following:
Assumption 2. For any type i, any contract C with bi(C) > 0 and vi(C) > 0,
and any positive number ε, there exists a contract C ′ such that vi(C ′) > vi(C)
and bi(C
′) ≥ bi(C)− ε.
Technically, Assumption 2 is easily shown to be equivalent to: V i(B) is
decreasing for B > 0. In words, the assumption says that a principal can
undercut any profitable contract that attracts a client. Principals must thus
be able to redistribute profits to the agent. This is verified in models of trade,
since the transfer specified in a transaction can be reduced. Similarly, in moral
hazard models one could think of increasing the agent’s wage. This can be done
without modifying incentives when the agents’ utility function is separable in
effort and income. However, Bennardo-Chiappori (2003) consider a pure moral
hazard model where the agent’s utility function is non-separable in effort and
income. If a richer agent is less prone to effort, they show that the Pareto
frontier may exhibit a horizontal segment. This invalidates assumption 2, at
least with contracts that do not involve randomization.
On the other hand, if one allows for randomization on contracts then as-
sumption 2 holds quite generally. For example, if there exists a contract C0
such that vi(C0) > V i(0), then from any contract C one can build a new
contract that is a lottery defined on {C,C0}, with a small enough probabil-
ity on C0 so that it both increases the agent’s payoff and hardly reduces the
principal’s. Assumption 2 then follows3.
3A similar trick can also make Vi continuous as required in the second part of assumption
1, thus avoiding the difficulties investigated in Arnott-Stiglitz (1988).
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Finally the game between principals and agents is the following. First,
principals simultaneously offer contracts to agents. Each principal may offer
any subset of C that includes C∅. Second, each agent chooses one contract
(possibly randomly) among the contracts offered by principals.
Notice that in our framework all agents always end up trading exactly one
contract, that can be the empty contract C∅. As usual, we label competitive
equilibria the subgame-perfect equilibria of this game4. Note that we do not
assume free entry (this would only reinforce our results). Our aim is to evaluate
the power of competition, under both verifiable and hidden information. A
natural benchmark is:
Definition 1. A contract C is efficient for type i if bi(C) = 0 and vi(C) =
V i(0). A family (Ci)i∈I of contracts is efficient if for any i ∈ I contract Ci
is efficient for type i. A competitive equilibrium is efficient if each type only
trades contracts that are efficient for this type.
2 Verifiable Types
Consider the situation in which the type i of each agent is perfectly observable
by all principals. (Again, this includes models of pure moral hazard.) We can
then reason as if there was a single type of agent. Our first result characterizes
the set of contracts that can be traded in equilibrium:
Proposition 1. Under verifiable types, for any i ∈ I we have:
i) If C is efficient for type i, then there exists a competitive equilibrium in
which C is sold with probability one.
ii) Under Assumptions 1 and 2, all competitive equilibria are efficient.
Proof: i) is immediate: if all principals propose contract C, then all type-i
agents agree to buy this contract from a (possibly randomly chosen) principal.
Moreover no principal can profitably deviate, since by definition of V i(0) to
attract any type i this principal would have to incur losses.
Let us now prove ii). At an equilibrium, note that a type-i agent must get
the same payoff Vi with each contract that he buys with positive probability.
Let B be the supremum of profits bi on this subset of contracts (this subset
cannot be empty, since no-trade means trading C∅). Notice that V i(B) ≥ Vi ≥
0, so that B is finite from the first part of assumption 1.
Suppose that B > 0. Aggregate profits on type i are at most equal to B,
so that one of the N principals – say, principal 1 – gets a profit at most equal
4We only consider pure strategies for principals.
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to B/N . Choose B′ such that B/N < B′ < B. Assumption 2 then implies the
existence of a contract C such that bi(C) ≥ B′ (and thus the profit on C is
strictly higher than the initial profit of Principal 1) and vi(C) > V i(B) (and
thus C attracts the agent since we know that V i(B) ≥ Vi). Hence principal
1 could profitably deviate by offering C at the first stage of the game, a
contradiction.
Therefore B = 0, and consequently all contracts sold with positive proba-
bility must yield zero profit. Moreover, if Vi < V i(0), then by the continuity
part in assumption 1 we have Vi < V i(ε) for ε positive and small, and thus
a principal could deviate to a profit-making contract that would attract the
agent5. 
Thus competition achieves efficiency when types are verifiable. This result
is a straightforward illustration of the power of competition when principals
compete a` la Bertrand. Still it is general enough to be applied to quite sophis-
ticated models, such as moral hazard models. To fix ideas, consider the model
in Dam and Perez-Castrillo (2006). Feasible contracts specify an observable
investment, an incentive wage, and an incentive-compatible effort. It is easily
seen that assumptions 1 and 2 hold in their model. Proposition 1 thus confirms
the result in Dam and Perez-Castrillo (2006) that equilibrium contracts must
be second-best efficient (taking incentive-compatibility into account), and that
principals get no rent6.
This seems contradictory with Bennardo-Chiappori (2003), who exhibit
competitive equilibria with positive profits for principals. As explained above,
agents in their model have nonseparable utilities; if only non-random contracts
are allowed, this invalidates our assumptions. With random contracts, their
example requires that the economy be subject to aggregate shocks – a feature
that we ruled out from the start.
5Relaxing the continuity part in assumption 1 would not alter the zero-profit result, but
would allow for inefficient equilibria with lower payoffs for the agent. Indeed let Vi(0+) be
the supremum of Vi(B) on {B s.t. B > 0}. If there exists a contract C such that bi(C) = 0
and Vi(0+) ≤ vi(C) < Vi(0), then one can build an equilibrium in which all principals
propose C, and the agent trades it: by construction no other profitable contract would
attract the agent.
6In the case when the number of agents is greater than the number of principals, one
can derive similar efficiency results; but now (1) maximizes the profits of a principal, under
a participation constraint for the agent.
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3 Hidden Information
We now tackle the case when the types of the agents are unknown to the
principals. The following result corresponds to Proposition 1.i:
Proposition 2. Suppose that there exists an efficient family of contracts
(Ci)i∈I that is moreover incentive-compatible:
∀ i, j ∈ I vi(Cj) ≤ vi(Ci).
Then whether information is verifiable or hidden, there exists a competitive
equilibrium in which all principals propose (Ci)i∈I, and each Ci is chosen by
type i.
Proof: Under verifiable information, the result follows from Proposition
1.i. Under hidden information, suppose that all principals propose (Ci)i∈I .
Because this family is incentive-compatible, the type-i agent maximizes his
payoff by choosing Ci. Moreover no principal can profitably deviate, since by
definition of V i(0) to attract any type i this principal would have to incur
losses. 
Now consider the private values case, in which the profit of a principal does
not depend on the agent’s type: bi(C) = b(C) for all types i and all contracts
C.
Proposition 3. Under private values, any efficient family of contracts is
incentive-compatible.
Proof: if the family (Ci)i∈I is efficient, then for any j bj(Cj) ≥ 0; under
private values, this implies for all i bi(Cj) = bj(Cj) ≥ 0. Hence Cj verifies
the constraint in the program V i(0), whose solution is Ci. Therefore vi(Ci) ≥
vi(Cj), so incentive-compatibility holds. 
Proposition 2 and 3 together imply that under private values all efficient
families of contracts can be obtained as equilibrium outcomes, both under veri-
fiable and under hidden information. In other words, efficient equilibria under
verifiable information remain equilibria under hidden information. We now
tackle the converse result, namely whether hidden information generates new
equilibrium outcomes that did not exist under verifiable information. There
is a technical difficulty here: an agent indifferent between two contracts may
change the probability with which he chooses each if a principal proposes an
additional contract, even if the new contract does not attract this agent. In
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the literature, this difficulty is typically dealt with by assuming that a princi-
pal can break ties in his favor. In fact, we can manage with a much weaker
assumption. We define robust competitive equilibria as follows:
Definition 2. A competitive equilibrium is robust if a principal cannot prof-
itably deviate by adding contracts to his offer, assuming that agents that do
not strictly prefer one of these additional contracts choose the same contracts
as before the deviation.
Loosely speaking, this assumes that each agent’s behavior satisfies a form of
independence of irrelevant alternatives. Then we obtain the following result,
which extends Proposition 1.ii (the proof is similar and is relegated to the
Appendix):
Proposition 4. Assume private values, and Assumptions 1 and 2. Then all
robust competitive equilibria are efficient.
As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, Fagart (1996) obtains sim-
ilar results, using stronger assumptions: two types of agents, with concav-
ity/convexity assumptions on preferences and feasible contracts. Fagart also
assumes that principals can undercut an incentive-compatible family of con-
tracts by proposing another incentive-compatible family that attracts all types
(ties are broken in favor of the principal) and only slightly reduces the princi-
pal’s payoff on each type. In contrast, in our framework ties are dealt with by
imposing robustness; and we only assume that introducing new contracts to
undercut some existing contracts is possible, without requiring that the new
set of contracts be incentive-compatible. These differences are mainly techni-
cal, but they allow us to greatly extend the scope of the results, as we now
discuss.
4 Some Results on the Common Value Case
Our results show that under private values hidden information does not matter:
it does not change the set of competitive equilibria, and each contract traded
is efficient for the type that chooses it. When for instance buyers are privately
informed on their preferences, values are private since sellers’ payoffs only
depend on transfers and costs. Therefore any inefficiency in trade must be
linked to the existence of market power.
Things are more difficult in the common value case, since an efficient fam-
ily of contracts need not be incentive-compatible. As it turns out, we can say
a bit more. Assume that types are one-dimensional and indexed by θ, that a
9
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contract specifies a continuous quantity q and a monetary transfer t, that prin-
cipals have utility function b(q, t, θ) and agents have utility function v(q, t, θ).
Assume smooth preferences, with opposite signs for v′t and b
′
t; assume also that
the efficient contract (q∗(θ), t∗(θ)) is interior, and differentiable in θ. Then the






and b(q∗(θ), t∗(θ), θ) = 0.
Now the gain for type θ from deviating from θ to θ′ is
G(θ, θ′) = v(q∗(θ′), t∗(θ′), θ)− v(q∗(θ), t∗(θ), θ).





We want the first-best to be incentive compatible, so G(θ, θ′) ≤ 0 for all θ, θ′,
or: ∫ θ′
θ
H(θ, x)dx ≤ 0 for all θ, θ′. (H)
When types are continuously distributed, we can take the limit as θ′ goes
to θ, either from below or from above. This implies that H(θ, θ) = 0 for any
interior θ, otherwise the agent would deviate in one or the other direction.
Standard calculations show that









t is negative, H(θ, θ) can only be zero if b
′
θ(q
∗(θ), t∗(θ), θ) = 0. Thus
competitive equilibria with common values (b depends on θ) can only be effi-
cient if values are “locally private” at the first best contract: given the efficient
contract, principals must be indifferent to small changes in θ.
Locally private common values are of course a very special case. The in-
surance sector provides an illustration. Consider the following straightforward
generalization of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model. The agent of type θ faces the
risk of a stochastic loss L˜(θ), and may buy one insurance contract in the set C.
A contract specifies a premium P and an indemnity I(L) conditioned by the
observed loss; the insurer’s payoff then is P −EI(L˜(θ)). The agent’s payoff is
u(P, I(.), θ), which for example can be written EU(I(L˜(θ))−P − L˜(θ)) in the
expected utility case.
10
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Note that hidden information here bears both on the agent’s preferences
and on his riskiness. The former is private values, but the latter is common
values as it changes the insurer’s profits for any given contract. Now assume
that the agent is risk-averse, and the principal is risk-neutral, so that under
verifiable information the competitive contract is the full insurance contract
I(L) = L, with the actuarially fair premium P (θ) = EL˜(θ). Then incentive-
compatibility holds if and only if the expected loss EL˜(θ) is the same for
all types; this corresponds to our definition of locally private values. This of
course does not hold in the seminal Rothschild-Stiglitz model, in which agents
differ in the probability that they incur a given loss. Still recall that insurers
usually gather very detailed information on their insurees; the variance of
the expected loss conditional on this information may in practice be small,
which would make competitive equilibria close to efficient even though the
distribution of losses may differ across types.
Introducing moral hazard in insurance models makes the picture more com-
plex because both the agent’s preferences and riskiness matter for the choice
of effort, so that both characteristics become common values. Then the prop-
erty of incentive-compatibility is more difficult to check, and typically does not
hold. In particular, Jullien-Salanie´-Salanie´ (2007) solves an insurance model
with adverse selection on the absolute risk-aversion index θ of the insuree, and
moral hazard on the prevention effort. Then the first best contract usually
does not fully insure the agent; for this contract the principal’s payoff will de-
pend on the agent’s risk-aversion since the latter underlies the choice of effort.
Therefore values are not locally private and competitive equilibria (if any) will
be inefficient if types are continuously distributed.
When the distribution of types is discrete, it is possible to construct reason-
able examples of models with common values in which first-best contracts are
incentive-compatible. If there are m possible types then condition (H) yields
m(m − 1) inequalities, and it may be possible to satisfy all of them. On the
other hand, when m increases this requires stronger and stronger restrictions
on preferences; in the limit they impose that values be locally private. As
announced in the introduction, the distinction between private and common
values seems to be the relevant one when one wants to characterize the impact
of hidden information on the efficiency of competitive equilibria.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4: The proof begins much as that of Proposition 1. At an
equilibrium each type i must get the same payoff Vi on the subset of contracts
11
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that he buys with positive probability. Denote Bi the supremum of b(.) on
this set. Define:
J (B) = {i ∈ I, Bi > B},
and let B be the supremum of those B such that J (B) has positive probability
(this construction allows us to ignore types with possibly high profits but zero-
probability). Notice that V i(Bi) ≥ Vi ≥ 0, so that B is finite from the first
part of assumption 1.
Suppose that B > 0. Choose B such that B/N < B < B. Aggregate
profits on each type in J (B) are at most equal to B, so one of the principals
– say, principal 1 – earns at most B/N on average on each type in J (B). We
now show how principal 1 can profitably attract all such types without losing
anything on other types.
For each j ∈ J (B), assumption 2 ensures the existence of a contract C ′j
such that vj(C
′
j) > Vj(Bj) ≥ Vj and b(C ′j) ≥ B. Now let principal 1 deviate by
adding to his equilibrium offer the contracts {C ′j, j ∈ J (B)}. Types j ∈ J (B)
strictly benefit from this deviation and buy one of the additional contracts with
probability one, and thus principal 1 gets a profit at least equal to B on each of
them. Types j /∈ J (B) that do not strictly benefit from the deviation can be
assumed not to change their behavior, since by assumption the equilibrium is
robust. Types j /∈ J (B) that strictly benefit from the deviation must choose
one of the additional contracts; but given the definition of J (B), any such
type generated a profit no larger than B in our equilibrium and so this cannot
hurt principal 1.
Overall principal 1 can obtain B > B/N on each type in J (B), without
losing anything on other agents. Since J (B) has positive probability, the
deviation yields strictly higher profits, and we have obtained a contradiction.
Therefore B = 0, and all contracts traded yield zero-profit to the principals.
Finally, if a non-negligible subset of types get strictly less than V i(0), then
thanks to assumptions 1 and 2 a principal could deviate by offering profitable
contracts that would attract these types (and maybe others, which is not a
problem under private values), once more a contradiction. 
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